Introduction
There are unacknowledged fault lines of tension between the literary and the literal in James' Principles of Psychology which set an interesting context for current debates in mental health. In particular, his description of experience is profoundly metaphorical and imaginative. Thought is one moment a "Stream" (Vol. 1, p. 85); another "herd of cattle" (Vol. 1 p. 337) and another a "bird" flying and perching (Vol. 1, p. 243) . Biology, on the other hand, and his linkage of the brain to the self are quite literal. The self of selves (the spiritual self), for instance, is analyzed all the way down to "peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat" (Vol. 1, p. 301, italics) . Dewey (1940) was one of the first to pick up this tension, arguing that James' naturalism leads towards an unfulfilled biological e behaviorist account of experience which uncomfortably coexists with a parallel account of a "psychic" subject. Similarly Schuetz (1941) argues that James' ascription of thought to cerebral conditions is rejected by phenomenology but his description of the "stream of thought" and "theory of fringes" finds an intriguing parallel with Husserlian phenomenology and more recently Gale (1999) has referred to The Divided Self of William James. There is the "Promethean" James, one who creates as much as discovers meaning in multiple worlds governed by interests, and the "mystical" James, who puts his faith in the absolute state of the universe and its constants (including its biological constants).
While James was writing in 1890, this fault-line is still being contested in mental health today. Symbolic, experiential accounts are still squaring off against literal biological and cognitivebehavioral accounts of the root causes and treatments for mental health issues (see, for instance, the Maudsley debates, Kings College London, 2016). The symbolic placebo effect is quite effective as a treatment for "mental illness" (Healy, 2008) , which allows skeptics to cast doubt on the more literal medical treatments (Breggin, 2008; Moncrieff, 2008) . Similarly "non-specific" factors such as the therapeutic alliance lead sceptics to doubt the efficacy of talking therapies including "Cognitive Behavioral Therapy" (e.g. McKenna, 2001; Parker, Roy, & Eyers, 2003) . Diagnostic labels are challenged as stigmatizing and unhelpful by some of those who receive these labels with the persistence of labels becoming a source of academic curiosity (Pilgrim, 2007) and there is a debate as to whether the evidence from brain scans of "mental illness" is really a creative interpretation of oxygen levels (see Thomas, 2014 , for an interesting critique of brain imaging). Moves towards a consensus position, such as the "biopsychosocial" model of mental health (which leaves some scope the literal and the literary to coexist) have arguably been unsuccessful, precisely on account of "biomedical self-confidence" (Pilgrim, 2002) around the medical causation of mental illness.
So what makes James relevant to these disputes when, in his own work, the differences between the literal and the literary pass by unremarkably? He is relevant because his metaphors, similes and analogies are under-utilized in these present-day debates (with the important exception of Leudar & Thomas, 2000, as we will see in section three). There are good reasons for this neglect, such as James' own reluctance to draw on his account of the "empirical self" to discuss "pathology." However, James is worth a second look and the timing for a renewal of interest is good. Despite the clashes between the literary and literal, in "evidence-based" government policies such as those of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence in Britain and the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, the prevailing view is that mental health diagnoses and treatments should follow a literal path. As a consequence, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and medication have emerged as the dominant treatment methods in AngloAmerican mental health practice. Both frameworks are compatible with the demands of this evidence base, where diagnostic definitions come with a detailed set of symptoms and specific time-scales (such as those provided by the DSM or ICD); the severity of the symptoms is open to measurement through symptom rating scales (such as the Hamilton Rating Scale or the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale); and clear comparisons between interventions, as one finds in randomly controlled trials, is possible. In fulfilling these evidence-based requirements, concepts invariably become more literal.
The public ubiquity of these literal models of mental health leads to a risk of "epistemicide" (Bennett, 2007) where an alternative to the dominant knowledge is lost or rendered invisible. Such epistemicide is already occurring in the public sphere, with evidence-based, medical approaches dominating the public imagination (Boyle, 2013) . What is at stake in current academic debates is more than just resistance against epistemicide, however; it is also the development of an experiential, humanistic understanding of mental health. This is evident in the move towards "user-led" research at the fringes of psychiatry, e.g. Romme, Escher, Dillon, Corstens, and Morris (2009), alongside an academic discourse which aims to continuously re-imagine unusual experience. Such an academic discourse is already well established at the critical end of psychiatry e see, e.g. Bracken and Thomas (2005) , Coles, Keenan, and Diamond (2013). As an extraordinarily original and imaginative account of the self undergoing trials and tribulations in experience, The Principles of Psychology can significantly add to this discussion.
The first significant contribution of the Principles that I will discuss here is even more basic. James asks a simple, highly pertinent question for the field of mental health today. How is it possible to "know" anything about an experience from its report, when the report is of a second order to the experience? This question challenges both literal and literary accounts of experience. More technically, James refers to the "psychologist's fallacy" (see also Valsiner, in this issue). In mental health circles, the question can be phrased as: "how do we know that there is distress or an unusual experience in the first place"? It is only after addressing this issue that I will go to develop a literary, experiential account of the onset and treatment of problems in the stream of thought e based on James' Principles.
Problem one: identifying problems within mental states: the psychologist's fallacy
The problem with identifying problems within mental states is an instance of the problem of the "psychologist's fallacy" (see Ashworth, 2009; Giorgi, 1981 for commentaries) . James (1890) argues that "we cannot be too watchful against its subtly corrupting influence" (Vol. 1, p. 197) . He defines it as the psychologist's "confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact of which he is making his report" and later "the assumption that the mental state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it" (Vol. 1, p. 197). As Stanley (2012) points out, for James, such a problem afflicts introspectionism e where the investigator is both observer and reporter of his or her own thoughts d but it is also a problem for first person/second person accounts of experience. The difficulty for the introspectionist (e.g., how to overcome the gap between an experienced thought and its reporting) is also a problem for contemporary psychology, where there is now a more institutionalized division between first person and second person accounts of thought.
One advantage of second-person accounts of thought from the professional perspective in psychology is that they allow for a common vocabulary for problems and a common or overlapping framework for treatment. Hence, mainstream treatments, such as CBT and medication for mental health problems use and share a common vocabulary for the target problems with thought, e.g. "thought disorder"; "obsessive thoughts"; "alien thoughts" or "hallucinations"; "delusional thoughts"; "disembodied thoughts"; "paranoid thoughts." In mainstream mental health these problems within the stream of thought are possibly symptomatic of even graver, more enduring conditions (such those enumerated in the DSM and ICD; e.g. "depression," "schizophrenia," "bipolar disorder"). This means that a diagnosis can lead to both a course of medication and a course of CBT simultaneously or sequentially, notwithstanding paradigmatic differences.
It is important to point out that this second-person account may exist only as a higher-order abstraction, perhaps useful only for case-notes or for enabling patient access to specialist services/insurance benefits, and in that sense co-exist as re-interpreted firstperson accounts (Barrett, 1996) . Treatment will emerge from a common professional vocabulary of diagnosis but aim to target the personal problems the patient experiences. Difficulties arise however when the psychologist's professional vocabulary does not map onto the experience of these thoughts, from within the thought itself, as James would say. For example, someone who putatively suffers from cognitive errors may not experience them as errors but rather as depressing realities (Boyle, 2002) .
Drawing on James' (1890) discussion of the "psychologist's fallacy," Giorgi (1981) refers to this kind of disagreement between perspectives as "intersubjective confusion." The scientist's perspective is confused with the patients' perspective. From this point of view, the fallacy is overcome when patient and scientist share the same perspective. This is precisely what happens through what is considered education or therapy, when patients may learn to speak about their thoughts using the same terms as the professional psychologist and report their observations of their thoughts as the psychologist would. In this sense, as Stanley (2012) argues, introspectionism is public and rhetorical. For example, both patient and therapist may adopt what Frank (1995) refers to as the "restitution narrative": illness is temporary and, through medical technology, may be cured. The patient now has a means of making
